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Abstract: 
Vertical separation of generation from electricity retailing has often been required as a condition of electricity 
market liberalisation. A well-developed and liquid contracts market is similarly suggested as necessary to 
manage the resulting wholesale market risks, which risks are further exacerbated by competition. Such contracts 
markets are rare, however, and increasingly evidence is emerging that vertical integration is associated not just 
with improved wholesale market risk management, but also reduced wholesale market power. This paper 
develops a theoretical model showing that non-vertically integrated generators will over-report their inverse 
supply curves, with the incentive to over-report increasing with the firm’s share of generating capacity. 
Conversely, in a vertically integrated industry, no over-reporting occurs when integrated firms have balanced 
shares in wholesale and retail markets. In general, firms whose share of generating capacity is higher (lower) 
than their retail market share will over-report (under-report) their inverse supply functions. Integration is found 
to affect retail electricity prices only via its effect on retail marginal costs. We find that retail prices are higher 
with vertical separation than with either balanced integration, or full integration without a wholesale market. 
These results suggest a re-evaluation of the importance of generator wholesale market power in vertically 
integrated electricity industries, and of measures to improve retail market competitiveness under either vertical 
integration or separation. 
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1. Introduction 
Conventional wisdom in electricity restructuring requires electricity generation to be 
horizontally separated, as well as de-integrated from open-access transmission, to enable 
competition between generators in wholesale electricity markets (Newbery (2002)). 
Moreover, the separation of electricity distribution from retailing is sometimes suggested to 
prevent possible use of market power in distribution to foreclose retail competition 
(Riechmann (2000)). However, despite empirical evidence from other industries indicating 
that vertical integration is apparently beneficial to consumers (e.g., Cooper et al. (2005)), 
consensus is less settled on whether generation should be vertically integrated with, or 
separated from, electricity retailing. While significant steps towards vertical unbundling have 
been taken at various stages in systems such as California, New England, Norway and Italy, 
this has not been the case in others such as PJM,1 much of Europe (e.g. Spain, France) and 
New Zealand. 
With vertical integration, contracts markets become thin and any non-integrated 
retailers are exposed to potentially ruinous wholesale price volatility. This failure risk deters 
entry in retailing and thereby potentially reduces retail market competition. At the same time, 
however, integration can also reduce the incentive for generators to exercise market power in 
wholesale markets (Mansur (2004)). With vertical separation – given that electricity contracts 
markets are typically thin or even unavailable (Newbery (2002), Chao et al. (2005)) – all 
retailers face potentially extreme wholesale price risk.2 Conversely, greater integration 
reduces generator-retailers’ reliance on contracts markets to manage their wholesale price 
exposure, both reducing bankruptcy risks and improving investment economics (Buehler et al. 
(2003), Finon (2006)). While integration may increase retail market power, this may not be 
entirely detrimental, preserving or even enhancing generation investment incentives (Dupuy 
(2006)), especially where wholesale price caps have been imposed (whether to combat 
perceived generator market power, or simply to limit wholesale price peaks). 
Despite these debates, evidence is emerging from restructured electricity markets that 
vertical integration can provide an important substitute for inadequate contract markets, and 
significantly influence market performance. Bushnell et al. (2004) compare market 
performance in the three largest and oldest US electricity markets – California, PJM and New 
England. They find that similar horizontal structures can produce dramatically different 
outcomes under different vertical arrangements. Whereas California had less concentration 
and greater import capacity than the other two, its complete lack of vertical integration and 
long-term contracting contributed to it experiencing higher electricity prices. Similarly, 
Borenstein et al. (2002) and Joskow and Kahn (2002) document evidence of market power 
being exercised in California, which contrasts with evidence from Bushnell and Saravia 
                                                 
1 The PJM Interconnection is the world’s largest competitive wholesale electricity market. It coordinates 
the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and the District 
of Columbia. 
2  See Borenstein (2002), Wilson (2002) and Mansur (2003) regarding California’s experience in 
particular. 
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(2002) of only modest market power being exercised in New England (where vertical 
separation was also enforced, but with vesting contracts). 
In this paper we concentrate on the effects of vertical integration between generation 
and retailing on the exercise of both wholesale and retail market power. We model spot 
wholesale and retail electricity markets assuming that a fixed number of generators compete 
to sell into the wholesale market via a sealed-bid auction. We proceed using a two-stage game 
in which retail prices are first set for committed supply, and then generators make their 
wholesale bids subject to a price-inelastic total demand. Of particular interest is the incentive 
for generators to overstate their inverse supply curves, in turn reflecting the extent to which 
they can influence the single wholesale clearing price. This incentive is examined in the cases 
of vertical separation and integration, and then extended to also consider retail prices. We find 
that generators always overstate prices when vertically separated from retailing, with the 
incentive to overstate inversely related to generator market share. Conversely, when 
generators are vertically integrated with the same retail market share as their respective 
wholesale market share, a Nash equilibrium exists with no over-reporting of inverse supply 
curves. More generally, firms with higher (lower) wholesale market share than retail market 
share will over-report (under-report). Finally, retail prices are higher in a market with vertical 
separation than in one with either full integration and no wholesale market, or with vertical 
integration and each firm having inter-market balance. 
The paper is organised as follows. To report an unusual natural experiment resulting in 
the formation of a vertically integrated electricity sector, Section 2 briefly describes the New 
Zealand electricity market, and summarises its unusual path to vertical integration. Section 3 
sets out the market structure assumed in our model. Section 4 analyses generators’ pricing 
incentives in our assumed wholesale market structure assuming at first that there is no vertical 
integration. Section 5 then allows for vertical integration. Section 6 extends the analysis to the 
retail market. Implications of our results are then discussed in Section 7. Finally, section 8 
concludes. 
2. The New Zealand Electricity Market and its Path to Vertical Integration 
As discussed in Evans and Meade (2005), the New Zealand electricity system comprises 
two main subsystems, based in the country’s North and South Islands, interconnected via an 
HVDC link. The system is predominantly hydro-based (60.5% of the total 8,840 MW 
capacity), of which 65% is located in the South Island (MED (2006)). This typically 
necessitates export of power north through the HVDC link, to demand centres concentrated 
predominantly in the upper North Island. Lake storage is relatively limited, however, and 
seasonal hydro inflows are highly volatile, exposing the system to tight supply conditions in 
“dry” years. Gas- and coal-based generation account for only 30% of capacity, with the single 
largest other generation type being geothermal (5% of capacity). 
All electricity is traded through a “gross pool” wholesale electricity market, despite 
around 15% of annual energy demand being supplied under long-term contract to an 
aluminium smelter (New Zealand Aluminium Smelter, NZAS). Prices are set on a half-hourly 
basis at 244 nodes throughout the country, with price separation between nodes reflecting 
transmission constraints and losses. Generation is dispatched on a least-cost basis by the grid 
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owner and operator, Transpower, using an “n-1” security-constrained optimisation model 
called SPD (Scheduling, Pricing and Dispatch). 
Generation is dominated by five companies, accounting for around 91% of generation 
capacity and 97% of total demand. These generators are all vertically integrated into retailing, 
forming so-called “gentailers”. In this respect the New Zealand market compares with that of 
Spain, in which four firms account for 93% of generation and 97% of retail sales (Kuhn and 
Machado (2004)). According to Evans and Meade (2005), the gentailers have net generation 
positions ranging from around -7% (Contact Energy) to +2% (Mighty River Power). 
New Zealand’s current position contrasts with that existing before, and even during 
much of, the electricity sector restructuring commencing in 1984. At that time 95% of 
generation capacity was state-owned, and integrated with transmission. While the then state-
owned monopoly, Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ), directly supplied a 
handful of large industrial customers, all electricity retailing had to that point been undertaken 
by locally- or municipally-owned concerns, which also supplied distribution services. 
The evolution of the New Zealand market from initial to present arrangements followed 
an unexpected course, and one which differed from that in many other reforming jurisdictions. 
Early reforms focused on the corporatisation of the combined retailing and distribution 
concerns, and the separation of transmission from ECNZ into the stand-alone state-owned 
grid company, Transpower. The vertical separation of generation from retailing was 
unnecessary, given they were not then already combined. Subsequently, the horizontal 
separation of ECNZ was necessitated to support the development of a competitive wholesale 
electricity market, the NZEM. This first took the form of a spinout of certain ECNZ 
generation assets into a separate state-owned enterprise, Contact Energy, which was quickly 
privatised. Full trading operations on the NZEM were then able to commence in October 
1996. ECNZ was finally separated into three more competing state-owned generators in April 
1999, Genesis, Meridian and Mighty River Power. 
Coinciding with ECNZ’s final break-up were two other reforms that radically but 
unintentionally led to New Zealand’s vertically integrated structure. First, with ECNZ’s 
generation dominance now removed, generators were permitted to own retailing activities 
which ECNZ had previously been deterred from acquiring. Second, controversial legislation 
requiring ownership separation between retailing and distribution activities, the Electricity 
Industry Reform Act 1998, also came into force. The acquisition of the retailing arms of 
almost all of the hitherto distributor-retailers by generators rapidly ensued. This was the 
intention of neither the separation of ECNZ into competing generators, nor the ownership 
unbundling of distributor-retailers. 
The “gentailer” model took two more years to achieve outright dominance, aided in part 
by an unusually dry winter in the middle of 2001, resulting in extremely low hydro storage 
levels. Natural Gas Corporation (NGC) had not long previously acquired the single largest 
retail customer base in the country, but had little generation capacity of its own. NGC’s 
existing hedge contracts began to expire in early 2001, but the company resisted entering into 
replacement contracts because it regarded the prices then available as excessive.3 With tight 
                                                 
3  See “Mighty River Contracts ‘Vindicated’ in Wholesale Power Price Crisis,” National Business Review, 
24 August 2001. 
 Page 3 of 15 
S. Hogan and R. Meade Vertical Integration and Market Power in Electricity Markets 
supply conditions arising during the months of peak winter demand, the wholesale prices 
faced by NGC rose significantly, while competition with other (vertically integrated) energy 
retailers limited its ability to raise retail prices. Facing losses exceeding NZ$300 million 
(US$125 million at then exchange rates) the company was consequently forced in August 
2001 to divest its retail customers to generators whose generation capacity provided a natural 
hedge against high wholesale prices. Wholesale prices fell from their highs to more typical 
levels soon thereafter, although hydro lake levels did not recover until much later in the year.4 
Both the April 1999 reforms and the 2001 “dry winter” provided natural experiments 
illustrating the natural inclination and risk-management rationale for generators to acquire 
retail customer bases. 
The resulting state of affairs has not received wide approval. Dry winters in 2003 and 
2006 resulted in episodes of sustained spiking wholesale electricity prices, as in 2001. Such 
episodes frequently led to accusations of the wholesale electricity market being flawed, of 
New Zealand’s reforms having “failed”, and of market power abuse by gentailers. They 
spurred the government to impose a reserve generation scheme in 2003 to provide a limited 
amount of additional capacity for use in dry winters. Government also provided a one-off 
underwrite of gas exploration risks for state-owned Genesis in 2004, to support the 
development of its proposed gas-fired plant, e3p, and thereby to bolster supply security. The 
New Zealand Electricity Commission, charged with industry regulation, has been empowered 
to force generators to issue contracts for some portion of their output to stimulate the 
development of a contracts market, despite gentailers currently being essentially fully hedged. 
Finally, in May 2005 New Zealand’s competition authority, the Commerce Commission, 
launched an inquiry into whether the country’s five largest generators were abusing market 
power in the wholesale market. The role of vertical integration in managing wholesale market 
risks, supporting investment in new generation to enhance supply security, and influencing 
the exercise of generator market power, currently remain unsettled questions in New Zealand 
(e.g. see Meade (2005a, b)). 
3. The Market Structure 
We assume that the market for electricity consists of a wholesale and a retail market. In 
the wholesale market, electricity generators compete for the right to supply electricity and 
retailer companies compete for the right to buy via a sealed-bid auction. In the retail market, 
retail companies compete for customers by posting prices. We model this market as a static 
two-stage game. In the first stage, retailers post prices and agree to supply whatever their 
customers demand at those prices. In the second stage, generators submit and retailers submit 
supply and demand bids to a market maker, who sets the price to equate total demand to total 
supply. In this model with a single market-clearing price, we have assumed away the 
complications that arise from the spatial separation of generators from end users and the 
resulting energy loss of transmission that necessitates separate prices at each injection and exit 
point. We have also assumed away the possibility of system failure that necessitates a reserve 
market.  
                                                 
4  This contrasts with the 2003 “dry winter” in which spiking wholesale prices fell to more normal levels 
at around the same time as hydro levels recovered. 
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Because of the sequencing of the two markets, retailers are committed to supplying to 
consumers whatever quantity of electricity is demanded before the wholesale auction takes 
place; accordingly, we assume that retailers submit inelastic demand bids to the market 
maker, at least in region where equilibrium prices emerge. Sellers, however, are assumed to 
submit upward-sloping supply curves. The assumption of inelastic demand bids in the 
wholesale market is designed to capture the relative stickiness of retail electricity prices due 
to the different time horizons between the retail and wholesale markets—retail customers 
typically face monthly billing, whereas the wholesale market is commonly repeated every 
hour or half hour.  
4. The Wholesale Market with no Vertical Integration 
In this section, we consider a market with a fixed number of generators competing to 
sell into the wholesale market via a sealed-bid auction.  We assume that the total demand in 
any period is inelastic in the wholesale price. Furthermore, at this stage we assume that the 
generators have no presence in the retail market and so have no impact on the size of that 
inelastic demand.   
Let the true supply curve for firm i in the wholesale market for electricity be ( ),i wy p  
and let the true market supply curve be  Let each firm’s true supply curve be a constant 
fraction of the market supply curve at each price so that  
( ).wY p
  ( ) ( ),i w i wy p Y pθ=  
with 
   1.i
i
θ =∑
The assumption that the firms’ true supply curves differs from each other only by a scale 
factor is a simply a mathematical convenience that allows us to express the firm’s relative size 
as a single number, .iθ  It is not crucial to the intuition. We will refer to iθ as firm i’s “natural 
market share”. The natural market share will correspond exactly to the realised market share 
only to the extent that all firms over-report their supply curves in the same proportion.  
Let ( )ip y  be firm i’s inverse supply curve, so that  
   ( ) ( ),i ip y c y′=
where  is firm i’s cost function. We assume increasing marginal cost so that the 
individual supply curves are well defined and increasing.  
( )ic y
The wholesale price is determined by having each firm announce a putative supply 
curve, the sum of which produces an announced market supply curve. The intersection of this 
announced supply curve with the fixed demand sets the market wholesale price, and firms are 
then obliged to produce up to that point on their announced supply curves while receiving the 
market price for each unit.  
Let ˆ ( )ip y  be firm i’s announced inverse supply curve, and let iλ  be the extent to which 
firm i overstates its inverse supply curve, so that  
   ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ).i i i i ip y p y c yλ λ ′= =
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The announced supply curve, ˆ ( )i w ,y p  is then  
  
ˆ ( ) ( / )
( / )
i w i w i
i w i
y p y p
Y p .
λ
θ λ
=
=  
Let /i wp p iλ= . The effect of a change in price on firm i’s demand is then  
  ( ) 1 .
ˆ
i i
i
w i
y Y p
p p
θ
iλ
∂ ∂= ⋅∂ ∂  
To lighten the notation, it will be convenient to define the marginal realised market share of 
firm i, :iω  
  
( ) 1
.( ) 1
i i
i
w i
i
j j
j j
j jw j
y Y p
p p
y Y p
p p
θ λω
θ θ
i
jλ
∂ ∂ ⋅∂ ∂= =∂ ∂ ⋅∂ ∂∑ ∑
 
Note that [0,1]iω ∈  with i0 (resp. 1) as 0 (resp.1).iω θ= =  Let X be the fixed demand for 
wholesale electricity. The equilibrium wholesale price is then the solution to  
   ( )/ .j w j
j
Y p Xθ λ =∑
From the implicit-function theorem,  
  
2
.1
w
i
w i i
i
i i
j
j j j
pY
dp p p
Yd
p
θ λ w ωλ λθ λ
∂ ⋅∂= =∂ ⋅∂∑
 
The profit of firm i in the wholesale market is  
  ( ) ( ) ( ( )),wi w i i i i ip y p c y pπ λ= ⋅ −  
so 
  
( )
( ) 2
( )
ˆ
1
1 ( )
wi w i i
i w i
i i i i
w i i i
i w
i i i i
w w i i w
i i i i
i i i i i
p y py p c y
p
p y py p
p
p p Y p pY p p
p w
π
λ λ λ
λ
λ λ λ
λθ θ λλ λ λ λ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂′= + − ⋅∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
⎛ ⎞∂ − ∂ ∂= + ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛∂ − ∂= + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞∂ − ⎟∂ ⎠
 
  ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1) 0w i w ii i i i
i i i i
p Y p pY p
p
λθ ω ωλ λ λ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ −= + ⋅ ⋅ −⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ∂ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
.=⎟⎟  (1) 
From this first-order condition, we can derive the following result:  
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Theorem 1:  
In any Nash equilibrium with (0,1) ,i iα ∈ ∀  all firms will over-report their supply 
curves, with over-reporting tending to increase as natural market share increases.  
Proof:  
From Equation (1), we have / 0wi iπ λ∂ ∂ > if 1,iλ ≤ implying that not over-reporting is 
always a dominated strategy. If we treat iω  as a parameter that is independent of the jλ , it is 
clear that / 0.i iλ ω∂ ∂ >  While, iω  is not necessarily monotone increasing in iθ , the increasing 
relationship between iω  and jλ  make it clear that in the limit, as 0,iθ →  1,iλ →  and that as 
1,iθ →  .iλ →∞   
  
Theorem 1 is essentially a Cournot result. That is, it shows that the Nash outcome of the 
kind of sealed-bid auction modelled here has over-reporting but with market power 
decreasing as market share decreases (say, through an increase in the number of firms), with 
perfect competition emerging in the limiting case of atomistic firms.  
5. The Wholesale Market with Vertical Integration 
Now consider the retail market for electricity. Retail firms buy their electricity from the 
wholesale market at price, ,wp  and sell it at a firm-specific price. In addition to the wholesale 
cost, there is an additional cost of  to firm i from selling i( )ri ic x x  units of retail electricity. 
This includes fixed and marginal costs of transmission and operating in the retail market. We 
assume that this cost is independent of the wholesale price, so, for example, transmission 
costs are not priced as a mark-up on the wholesale price. 
 We consider the pricing decision of retail firms, which constitutes the first stage of the 
two-stage game, in the next section. In this section, we consider the effect of vertical 
integration between generators and retailers on the second-stage game that is the wholesale 
market. This means, we take the firms’ retail prices as given at the time the auction strategies 
are being determined. The only change that vertical integration has on the model from the 
previous section, then, is that each wholesale firm will also have some proportion of the fixed 
demand, X, that will be their own demand as a retailer. Let iβ  be generation firm i’s share of 
total demand in the retail market, and let riπ be the Firm i’s profit from its retail arm, so that  
  ( ) (ri ri w i ri i ).p p X c Xπ β β= − −  (2)  
Firm i’s total profit is then 
  ,i wi riπ π π= +  (3) 
and the relevant first-order condition for determining iλ  is now  
  0.i wi w i
i i i
p Xπ π βλ λ λ
∂ ∂ ∂= − =∂ ∂ ∂  (4) 
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Theorem 2:  
If all firms have the same market share in the retail market as they have in the wholesale 
market, there is a Nash equilibrium in which there is no over-reporting at all. In general, firms 
with a higher natural wholesale market share than retail will over-report while those with a 
lower market share will under-report, with the degree of mis-reporting being greater, the 
greater is the extent of mismatch.  
Proof: 
Consider the putative equilibrium in which 1, .i iλ = ∀  In this case, ,i wp p i= ∀  
 ,i i iω θ= ∀ and ( ) ( ) ,  i wY p Y p X i.= = ∀  Substituting these values into Equations (1) and (4) 
confirms the existence of the equilibrium. The general tendency for over-reporting when 
wholesale natural market share exceed the retail market share arises from the same increasing 
relationship between iω  and jλ  noted in the proof to Theorem 1.  
  
Theorem 2 is interesting for two reasons. First, it indicates an alternative route than 
Theorem 1 for achieving a perfectly competitive market. Theorem 1 indicates that in a non-
vertically-integrated market, perfect competition requires atomistic firms, which is not 
compatible with the high fixed costs of electricity generation. Theorem 2, however, shows 
that vertical integration with market-share balance can achieve the same outcome.  
Second, the theorem provides a way of interpreting pricing behaviour in a partially 
integrated market where there is a major player at either the generator or the retail level who 
is not present on the other side. Consider first the case with there is one generator without a 
retail arm while the remaining generators divide the retail market between them. In this case, 
Theorem 2 shows that each of the vertically integrated generators would under-report their 
inverse supply curves. To an observer, this behaviour might look like predatory pricing—that 
is, deliberately pricing below cost in order to induce exit of the non-integrated competitor and 
thus face lower competition in a later period. Our result, however, was obtained in a static 
one-shot game. That is, under-reporting inverse supply would be the profit maximising 
strategy in a single period without any consideration of future competition.  
A similar situation applies when there is a major retailer without a generation arm. In 
this case, Theorem 2 implies that the generators would then have higher market shares in the 
wholesale market than in the retail market, and thus over-report their costs. Again, this is the 
Nash outcome in a static, one-shot game, but it could be construed as anti-competitive 
predatory behaviour of the generators trying to induce exit of the non-integrated retail firm.5  
                                                 
5  Allegations of such predatory conduct were made following the dry winter of 2001 and NGC’s rapid exit 
from non-integrated retailing. They were considered by the then Market Surveillance Committee of the 
NZEM but not held to have involved either an abuse of market power or market manipulation. See NZEM 
(2001) or Evans and Meade (2005). 
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6. The Retail Market 
Now let’s model the pricing behaviour of retail firms in some more detail. We assume 
that firms set prices and then commit to supplying whatever quantity is demanded at those 
prices. Each firm’s demand and hence its profit is a function of its price and the prices of all 
other firms, so we write 
  ( )( , ),i i ri r ipπ π −= p  
where ( )r i−p  is the vector of prices of all retail firms other than firm i. In this price-setting 
model, firms set their price as a mark-up on marginal cost where the mark-up depends on the 
elasticity of the firm-specific demand functions. This elasticity depends on the degree of 
competition in the retail market and is independent of the degree of vertical integration. 
Where integration can matter is in determining marginal cost. To allow the notation to 
encompass different assumptions about the market structure, let iφ be a parameter in firm i’s 
profit function such that an increase in iφ  implies an increase in marginal cost for all output 
levels. Let ( )( ,i r i ir )φ−p  be the best-response function for firm i. Rather than making 
assumptions about the demand structure underlying the profit functions and hence the best-
response functions, we simply impose the following restrictions on : ( )( )i r ir −p
Assumption 1:  
a)  is single-valued and continuous in ( )(i r ir −p ) ( )r i−p for all i 
b) ( )
( )
0 ,i r i
rj
r
j i i
p
−∂ ≥ ∀ ≠ ∀∂
p
 
c) ( )
( )
1 s.t. .i r i
j i rj
r
i
p
ε ε−
≠
∂∃ < ≤ ∀∂∑
p
 
d) ( )
( , )
0 .i r i i
i
r
i
φ
φ
−∂ > ∀∂
p
 
These assumptions encompass a large range of standard models, including perfect monopoly, 
and perfect competition.  
Theorem 3:  
a) If Assumption 1 holds, then there exists a unique retail-price Nash equilibrium, 
, *rp
b) 
**, 0, 0rjri
i i
ppi jφ φ
∂∂∀ > ≥ ∀∂ ∂ .i≠  
Proof:  
Parts (a) – (c) of Assumption 1 guarantee that the best-response functions constitute a 
contraction mapping implying the existence of a unique equilibrium. (For a statement of this 
result, see Cachon and Netessine, (2003)). To see the second result, consider an equilibrium, 
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*,rp with costs 1 2( , , )φ φ φ= L , and then consider alternative costs 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ) .φ φ φ φ= <L  From 
Assumptions 1(b) and 1(d), we can see that the best-response functions must map 
1j
[0, *]
n
rjp= onto itself. By the Brouwer fixed-point theorem, therefore, there must exist a fixed-
point that is not which, by part (a), must be the unique equilibrium. 
×
.
*,rp
  
The effect of the second part of Theorem 3 is that we only need to consider the effect on 
retail firms’ marginal costs to analyse the effect of market structure on retail prices. Consider 
first a fully integrated market in which each retail firm was responsible for generating its own 
supply without there being a wholesale market.  
Theorem 4:  
Retail prices are higher in a non-vertically integrated market than in a fully integrated 
market without a wholesale market. 
Proof:  
In the case of a fully integrated market with no wholesale market, the marginal cost of 
each retail firm would be  
   (5) ' 'i ric c+
In contrast, in a fully separated market, the marginal cost would be 
  ' .w rip c+  
From Theorem 1, however, we know that in a fully separated market,  
   '  .w jp c j> ∀
The result then follows automatically.  
  
Now consider a market where there is partial integration so that some retail firms have 
some presence as suppliers in the wholesale market. This will have two effects. First, the 
partial integration will affect the wholesale price through the mechanism described in Section 
5. Second, the firm’s marginal cost of selling an additional unit on the retail market also 
includes the negative of the change in wholesale profit at the margin. This occurs if the 
increase in the retailer’s sales does not come fully at the expense of other retailers—that is, if 
its reducing its retail price induces more demand in part by having consumers purchase more 
in total rather than by substituting a fixed demand from one retailer to another.6 In this case, 
the firm’s wholesale profit increases by its market share times the increase in total demand, X, 
times the difference between the wholesale price and generation marginal cost.  This pushes 
                                                 
6 The secondary effect of changes in both total demand and market share on the equilibrium iλ and hence 
can be ignored because of the envelope condition. wp
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the firm’s marginal cost closer to the pure technological cost of Equation (5). We can then 
consider the special case of perfect market share balance:  
Theorem 5:  
Retail prices in a vertically integrated market with market-share balance are the same as 
in a fully-integrated market with no wholesale market.  
Proof:  
From Theorem 2, we know that the wholesale price will just equal each firm’s marginal 
cost of generation. The second-order effect on marginal cost if a retail price reduction induces 
an increase in total demand depends on a gap between wp and ' ,jc  which disappears in this 
case. The result follows automatically from this.  
  
Theorems 4 and 5 have implications for competition policy in the electricity market. 
The key result is that any monopoly power that exists in the retail market exists independently 
of the market structure. Changes in the structure can only affect retail prices through effects 
on the marginal cost that is marked up. The best outcome that can be achieved for retail prices 
through competition policy at the wholesale level is to try and induce market share balance 
between the two markets. So, for instance, if the retail market were characterised by high 
monopoly power with only one or two firms competing for customers, with a similar 
concentration in the wholesale market, it would be a mistake (in this model) to try and induce 
greater competition in the wholesale market by breaking up generation companies into 
smaller units.  
7. Discussion 
Our model’s prediction that vertically integrated generators will over-report their 
inverse supply curves when their wholesale market share exceeds their retail market share 
resembles the findings of others that vertically integrated generators that are net sellers have 
an incentive to exercise market power (Mansur (2003), Kuhn and Machado (2004)). Indeed, 
our prediction concurs with Kuhn and Machado’s, that entry by non-integrated retailers could 
increase spot wholesale prices since it would cause generators to become net sellers. 
Superficially this suggests that the acquisition of retail customer bases by generators after 
April 1999, and the sale of non-integrated NGC’s retail customer base to generators in 2001, 
should have been beneficial for wholesale pricing in New Zealand. 
Newbery (2002) extends this analysis, noting that competition among non-vertically 
integrated retailers also increases wholesale price risks to generators, with adverse 
consequences for investment. This is because such retailers prefer short-term over long-term 
contracts to mitigate their risk of falling wholesale prices. As Newbery puts it (p. 2): “The 
natural response to this increased risk is for incumbents to vertically and horizontally integrate 
to better manage risk, deter entry, manage the capacity margin, and hence restore prices to 
profitable levels.” Chao et al. (2005) similarly observe the mutuality of interest between 
generators and retailers to mitigate systemic risks in electricity markets. However, Newbery 
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(2002) cautions against such integration because of adverse effects on entry, instead 
preferring the maintenance of retail customer franchises under yardstick competition (which 
Finon (2006) also argues to be an effective alternative to integration). 
8. Conclusion 
Our model suggests that vertical integration between generation and retailing in 
electricity markets should not be presumed to worsen generator market power in either 
wholesale or retail markets. On the contrary, it predicts that the incentive to exercise 
wholesale market power always exists when generators and retailers are vertically separated. 
Conversely, where the incentive to exercise market power arises under vertical integration, 
our work suggests that it is the mismatch between wholesale and retail market shares – not 
absolute market share itself – that is the cause. Even in this case, however, the prediction 
holds true for integrated generators that are net sellers. For net buyers the reverse is true, with 
an incentive to under-report wholesale prices (although our model’s static setting means this 
result cannot be taken to imply predatory pricing).  
Since retail market power involves firms marking up their retailing marginal costs, this 
suggests that minimising such retail market power as well as wholesale prices are both 
important in welfare terms. However, with vertical integration we find that inter-market 
balance is the relevant consideration when minimising wholesale prices, whereas under 
vertical separation wholesale market competitiveness remains a valid concern. Because of the 
impossibility of perfectly competitive wholesale markets given current generation 
technologies, this implies that the wholesale price component of retail prices can only feasibly 
be minimised by the pursuit of balanced vertical integration, even when there is only a limited 
number of generators. By contrast, with vertical separation wholesale prices will, realistically, 
always be overstated.  
Obvious extensions that would enhance the usefulness of these findings include 
allowing for spatial considerations such as network effects and wholesale market 
“regionalisation” due to transmission constraints. They would also include dynamic 
considerations such as the impact of vertical integration on the management of wholesale 
market price risks and investment incentives. These extensions are left for future research. 
In policy terms our work suggests that caution be exercised when considering whether 
vertical separation should be imposed on generators, particularly where adequate contract 
markets cannot be demonstrated to provide an adequate alternative. It also suggests that care 
should be exercised when assessing whether any particular generator is in a position to 
exercise market power in either wholesale or retail markets, since the extent of its vertical 
integration into retailing will be a relevant consideration. Aside from addressing retail market 
power directly, electricity reformers and competition authorities would do best by allowing 
balanced vertical integration to evolve. Based on our analysis, with balanced vertical 
integration in place attention would be better paid to any market power in electricity retailing. 
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